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July 23, 1955. As is quite usual, the author's name does not appear.
However, we are reliably informed that this article was written by a
Catholic, an eminent barrister and Queen's Counsel.

CONFLICT OR CO-OPERATION?
A Task for Legal Statesinaiiship

THE opening Session of the Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference has been most fittingly held in the presence of the Lord Chancellor
and the Queen's Judges in the Great Hall that William Rufus built at
Westminster. Among the lawyers who assembled there were delegates
from all the organized legal bodies of the Commonwealth and Empire;
from Europe and Africa and Asia and Australasia, and from the Americas
also: the largest delegation came from Canada. It was in a real sense a
home-coming, for Westminster Hall was for many centuries the forge
and radiant centre of the system of law that spread with the expansion
of English civilization and is known throughout the world as the Common Law of England.
The formulation of the principles of the Common Law belongs to
what Pollock and Maitland call "the luminous age" that lies between
1154 and 1272:
"It was the critical moment in English legal history, and therefore in the
innermost history of our land and race. It was the moment when old custom
was brought into contact with new science. Much in our national life and
character depended on the result of that contact ....
It was for the good of
the whole world that one race stood apart from its neighbours, turned away
its eyes at an early time from the fascinating pages of the Corpus Juris
Civilis, and, more Roman than the Romanists, made the grand experiment
of a new (legal) system. . . . Those few men who were gathered at Westminster round Patteshull and Raleigh and Bracton, were penning writs that
would run in the name of kingless commonwealths on the other shore of
the Atlantic Ocean; they were making right and wrong for us and for our
children."

The reference to kingless commonwealths is a reminder that beyond
the existing limits of Commonwealth and Empire, in all the States save

THE CATHOLIC

one of the American Union (as well as in
Ireland, North and South) the minds of men
are formed and their moral and political
action guided by the principles and traditions of the Common Law.
A system of law which had its origin in
the England of the twelfth and the thirteenth
centuries was necessarily Christian in inspiration and character. In fact, each of the
men who is named on the final page of
Pollock and Maitland was a prelate of the
Christian Church. Martin of Patteshull was
Archdeacon of Norfolk and Dean of St.
Paul's, William of Raleigh was Bishop of
Norwich and, at a later time, of Winchester;
Henry of Bracton was Archdeacon of Barnstaple and at his death in 1268 was Chancellor of Exeter Cathedral. The greatest,
the most lasting triumph of Henry II, says
Maitland, is that he made the prelates of
the Church his Justices:
"During the whole of the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries English law was administered by the ablest, the best educated men
in the realm, by the self-same men who were
the Judges Ordinary of the Church's Courts.
...It is by popish clergymen that our old
common law is converted from a rude mass
of customs into an articulate system, and
when the popish clergymen, yielding at
length to the Pope's commands, no longer
sit as the principal Justices of the King's
Court, the creative age of our medieval law
is over."1
The makers of the common law had, according to the testimony of one who became
a member of the Supreme Court of the
United States, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, brought into existence a "more
logical, more developed and a mightier body
of law than the Roman"; "a far more civilized system than the Roman Civil Law."
Though one may never forget that the
Pollock and Maitland, Vol. I., pp. 132-4.
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Christian Emperor, Justinian, compiled and
published "in the name of Our Lord Jesus
Christ" the Institutes, the Code and the
Digest which constitute the Corpus Juris
Civilis, one may also recall that the constitutive principles of the Roman Civil Law are
not always easy to reconcile with Christian
ideas.' The Roman Civil Law was in its
origin a pagan system, and had little regard
for the sanctity of human life, born or unborn, slave or free; or for the sanctity of
marriage as it is understood in Christendom,
or for the limitations that must be put on
absolute power in the State. The Emperor
or Princeps was above the law. His will was
law; quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem. He ruled Church and State. "The first
lesson that we learn if we open the Code,"
says Maitland, "is that an Emperor can
legislate, De episcopis et clericis, De sacrosanctis ecclesiis, nay, for the matter of that,
De summa trinitate et fide catholica."
The concepts and principles of the Common Law were from the beginning in line
with Christian ideas. In England (it was
not so in Rome) the Church was a more
venerable institution than the State. In English law, human life-even the life of the
unborn child-had its proper sanctity, its
proper title to freedom. The law of Christian
marriage was administered by the Canonists
in the Courts Christian. As for the Prince
(whom we call King), Rex est sub deo et
sub lege. "The King," says Bracton, "is
2In

the dedication of his work, Les Moines de

l'Occident to Pope Pius IX, Montalembert spoke
his mind about the myth of the Roman Civil Law;
and in his little work La Philosophie des Lois
(1946) the late P~re Sertillanges, O.P., spoke of
"lesemi-empirisme du droit romain. droit rationnel
dans sa structure, dans sa contexture, mais domine par un imprrialisme du dedans et du dehors,
par une sorte de volont4 de puissance ii lafacon de
Nietzsche: domination de soi-m~me et d'autrui
sans justification rationnelle suffisante."
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under God and the law, because the law
makes the King, There is no King where
Will and not Law is the principle of his
rule." The argument of Bracton (which is
seldom printed) is most revealing. That the
King ought to be under the law, he says,
"is clearly shown by the example of Our
Lord Jesus Christ":
"For although there were available to
God, in his design for the salvation of the
human race, ways and means beyond our
telling, His divine mercy chose this way (of
the Incarnation of Our Lord) for undoing
the work of the devil. He used not the Might
of His Power, but the Counsel of His Justice.
He was willing to be under the law in order
that He might redeem those who were under
the law. In preference to the use of Power,
He chose the way of Judgment. So also the
Blessed Mother of God, the Virgin Mary
who, by a unique privilege, was above the
law, as an example of humility condescended
to follow the ordinances of the law. Sic ergo
rex: the king also should act in like manner,
nor should his power lack a bridle."
In medieval England the idea of a World
State governed by the Roman Emperor (or
according to some theorists, like Dante, by
the populus Romanus) had little meaning
in the minds of reasonable men. The common lawyers of the Inns of Court did not
take sides or greatly interest themselves in
the constant struggle between Emperor and
Pope which was waged on the mainland of
Europe between Roman Civilians on the
one side and Roman Canonists on the other
side, with arguments and analogies drawn
from the Two Swords and the Sun and the
Moon.
At the turn of the Reformation, by the
Statute of Appeals in 1534, Henry VIII
(now being advised by Thomas Cromwell,
a disciple of Machiavelli and of Marsilio of

Padua) declared himself an Emperor and
England an Empire, and claimed, as Emperor, to exercise jurisdiction over Church
and State. The Act of Supremacy made it
high treason for any subject to dispute the
King's title to be, and to be reputed, Head
of the Church in England.
In face of the pretensions of the KingEmperor and his Imperial Parliament, the
most illustrious of the common lawyers (he
had resigned the office of Lord Chancellor)
chose death rather than deny the Papal
Supremacy for, as he said, with terrible
concision, in answer to Antonio Bonvisi:
"That holdeth up all." In the speech he made
after the verdict in Westminster Hall Sir
Thomas More told his judges that an Indictment "grounded upon an Act of Parliament
directly repugnant to the law of God and
His Holy Church was in law, among Christian men, insufficient to charge any Christian man." And, after the manner of the
common lawyers, the rhythm of whose
thought was always "the law of God, the
law of reason (or of nature) and the law of
the land," he went on to declare in point of
reason, that this realm, being but one member and small part of the Church, might not
make a particular law disagreeable with the
general law of Christendom, no more than
the City of London, being but one poor
member in respect of the whole realm, might
make a law against an Act of Parliament to
bind the whole realm. And he added that
the new Act was contrary to the law and
Statutes of England as they might see in
Magna Carta: "that the Church in England
shall be free and have all its laws in their
integrity and its liberties unimpaired"; and
contrary also to the sacred oath which the
King with great solemnity received at his
Coronation.
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The rejection of his argument and the
execution of Sir Thomas More marked a
revolution in the English law. In his recent
book on The Tudor Revolution in Government,' Mr. G. R. Elton writes:
"It is enough if one man knows what
he is about, and Thomas Cromwell at least
knew that. The establishment of the Royal
Supremacy over the Church, the expulsion
of the Pope and the assertion of the unlim-

ited sovereignty of Statute, destroyed the
foundations of medieval polity and society
and put something new in their place.
Thomas More knew well why he opposed
the voice of Christendom to an Act of Parliament, and Thomas Cromwell knew equally
well what his assertion of the omnicompetence of Parliament meant. They both knew
that they were witnessing a revolution. The
general intellectual and spiritual effects of
the revolution came later - as effects not
causes - but that does not make it any less
of a revolution."
In the reign of Henry VIII, says Professor
Holdsworth:
"It was realized (our italics) that Acts of
Parliament, whether public or private, were
legislative in character; and the judges were
obliged to admit that these Acts, however
morally unjust, must be obeyed. The legislation which had deposed the Pope and made
the Church an integral part of the State, had
made it clear that the morality of the provisions of the law or the reasons which induced
the legislature to pass it, could not be regarded by the Courts.... There was no need

therefore for the Courts of Common Law to
be anything but useful servants of the
Crown.'
aCambridge University Press, 1953, pp. 246-7.

The judgment of Mr. Elton coincides with that of
Dr. James Gairdner in his History of the English
Church in the Sixteenth Century, p. 240: "The

revolution effected by Henry VIIi was a thing
without a parallel in history, and it is hard to realize it all at the present day."
' Holdsworth, H.E.L., Vol. IV., pp. 185, 188.

In the course of time a heavy price had
to be paid for the luxury of a Parliament that
was at one and the same time Imperial and
Omnipotent. One part of the price was paid
in the loss of Ireland and of the American
Colonies. Another part of the price was the
slow decline in the language of the law and
in the idea of law which lost the memory of
its divine origin. More than half a century
ago Professor Heinrich Brunner remarked
that there had been since the Tudor time
a progressive deterioriation in the language
of the English Statutes. In our own time
judges-even in the highest tribunal-have
been known to protest against the unintelligibility of the statutes and statutory instruments they are called upon to interpret. Only
the other day, at Birmingham, a distinguished law lord denounced as para law
and sub law the sort of thing that now passes
under the name of law.
And for the Omnipotence of Parliament,
it is true enough that in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries Parliament undertook
not only to depose the Pope but also to
define the doctrines of the Christian faith
and the prayers that are proper to be said
by Christian people. Even after 1857, apropos the debates on the Matrimonial Causes
(i.e. Divorce) Bill, the EncycloprediaBritannica declared that "the textual controversy
was nowhere carried on with greater acuteness or under more critical conditions than
within the walls of the British Parliament."
During the debates on the A. P. Herbert
Bill of 1937, there was little talk of the
Scriptures. Does anyone nowadays believe
in the ability of the Imperial Parliament to
define the doctrines of the Christian faith?
or to impose its will on the peoples of the
Commonwealth?
The lawyers of Commonwealth and Em(Continued on page 340)
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validity of that provision of Hebrew law.
because the woman was not a "person
born in the Hebrew faith" at the time of
the marriage. The Massachusetts court also
rejected arguments that judicial enforcement of the condition would be a violation
of the Constitutional guarantees of religious
freedom afforded by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Zoning Restrictions
In an article 78 proceeding to review the
Town Board of Brighton's refusal to permit
the erection of a Catholic church building,

the court held that the constitutionality of
the zoning regulations could not be raised
in such a proceeding. [Diocese of Rochester
v. Planning Board of Town of Brighton,
207 Misc. 1021, 141 N.Y.S. 2d 487 (Sup.
Ct. Monroe Co. 1955)]. See I CATHOLIC
LAWYER 64 (January 1955); id. at page
254 (July 1955).
The Diocese of Rochester has appealed
from the order dismissing the proceeding
and, in addition, has commenced a new action for a declaratory judgment, the purpose of which is to obtain a decision on the
constitutional questions involved.
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pire and their English colleagues who assembled in Westminster Hall are no longer
united in obedience to an Imperial and
Omnipotent Parliament on the Reformation
model. The bonds that unite them are the
older and more enduring principles and
traditions of the Common Law. And the
true heirs of the Common Law are prepared
with Henry of Bracton to acknowledge the
Papal Supremacy in spiritual things:
"Our Lord the Pope is pre-eminent in
matters spiritual which relate to the priesthood, and under him are archbishops, bish-

ops. and other inferior prelates. Also in matters temporal there are Emperors, kings and
rulers in matters relating to the kingdom, and
under them are dukes, barons and knights."
Outside Moscow, the Roman Emperors
are indeed no more. The Roman Civil Law
is at an end. In the years to come, in the
West, the task of legal statesmanship will
no longer be to subdue a constant and bitter
conflict between Civilian and Canonist; but
to effect an adjustment and reconciliation
between the Christian principles and traditions of the Canon and the Common Law.

